Common Sense on Civil Nuclear Cooperation
Churchill remarked after the Battle of Britain - never in the history of human combat was so much owed by so many to so few. I was reminded of these words after reading the text of the US Congressional Bill on Indo-US peaceful nuclear energy cooperation. Never, I thought, in the history of relations between states has so much been demanded of so many by so few.
The 500-odd members of the US Congress want India never to test again, regardless of circumstances. They want India not to enrich uranium. They want no reprocessing. They want no heavy water technology for India. They want India to adhere unilaterally to NSG and MTCR, as well as to PSI. This means India must accept all the responsibilities that go with membership of these bodies, but enjoy none of the benefits.
They are asking for intrusive controls, and oversight, on India's fissile material production.
The ultimate goal of the US Congress is to eliminate India's nuclear weapons. And they are proclaiming this in the Bill.
The Bill also wants to make India's foreign policy congruent to America's own, specially on Iran. This is truly breath-taking. You would expect that a country that is facing defeat in Iraq and Afghanistan, and is pretty much snookered in North Korea and Iran, is heading for confrontation with Russia and China, has alienated significant elements in Europe, would tell its friends - don't be like us! But, no, hubris reigns, and the US Congress demands that India make the same mistakes that America has made.
The explanatory notes attached to the Bill are equally revealing. To my reading, the most important is that they all but openly contradict Prime Minister Singh. This is the part where they address the statement to the Indian Parliament by the Prime Minister that in case of disruption of supplies, America and like-minded countries will get together to overcome the problem. The position in the Bill is that this can only be in the event of a market-related disruption. If, however, the disruption is caused by any "violation" by India of the unilateral conditions, America will actually ensure that no other country can step in and help out.
All of this is only for a one-time exception for India, for what happened before July 2005, the date of the Indo-US Joint Statement. For the future, India remains bound by the rules applicable to non-NWS under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Indeed, the demands and the supervision are even greater. What is more, the US President must offer annual assessments on India's "compliance" with the demands, as well as on India's overall nuclear posture - how much uranium was mined, how much used for weapons, how many weapons manufactured, and so on.
It is clear that America has shifted the goal posts. In fact, it has changed the nature of the agreement completely. What started out as an agreement on civil nuclear cooperation, has ended up as the offer of an agreement to shackle India to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In this form it is unacceptable. and, specially under a Democrat-controlled Congress, it is the only form we shall have on offer from the US.
It is also clear, from reading the text closely, that the Americans are leaving the door open for Pakistan to be allowed the same - or similar - terms. The chances are that America will not, itself, supply nuclear-related material to Pakistan, but this does open the door for China to do so. An agreement among NSG members to allow an exemption for India will probably only be passed if the NSG meets China's probable demand that the same be allowed for Pakistan.
It is also clear that America has lately - since the mid-1990's - been taking an attitude towards India that it would towards a client or dependent state. They ensured that India had no choice but to veto the CTBT by entering a provision that required an unwilling India (among other- willing - countries) to sign and ratify the Treaty for it to enter into force. This was unprecedented in the history of diplomacy and treaty-writing. All of this started a sequence of events that led to the eventual decision by India to test nuclear weapons in 1998. We are seeing the same kind of unilateral approach in this Bill.
It is likely that successive Indian Governments have given the Americans the sense that this kind of approach will yield results. But this is contradicted by the facts on the ground, and the history of later developments, which demonstrated that the pressure had backfired. You would expect America to have the good sense and intelligence to realise this. You would be wrong, it seems.
It is also instructive to read the writings of the supporters of the current Bill in India. Of those that I have read, none is offering a justification of the Bill that has emerged from the US Congress. Their basic position is that this is the best you can expect from the US. They also implicitly accept that the Bill does indeed depart substantively from the 18 July 2005 Statement. But, they say, look at the bigger picture, move beyond the minutiae and stop auditing the pluses and minuses. In my experience, when someone asks that we see the bigger picture, there is a defect in the smaller picture.
Also, the standard counsel of fear: if India will not accept this, it will damage ties with America.
For the rest and the bulk, a lot of abuse aimed at the opponents of the Bill. That is not good enough a defence of the Bill.
Friendship between India and America is important for India. No one in their right mind has any doubts about this. Fortunately, this is also what is happening. Economic relations are growing at an unprecedented rate. Business-to-business ties are on the up. Military contacts are increasing. Science and technology is another area where the two countries are moving forward.
In fact, in the high-level focus on the nuclear deal, many have lost sight of the equally important defence agreement that was signed in June 2005, just a few weeks before the nuclear deal. This has the potential to set a new level of defence cooperation between India and the US.
So let us leave this infructuous effort aside - a false start. This happens in human affairs, and there is nothing to be ashamed of in having tried and failed. No great harm will follow. It didn't when India refused to sign the NPT back in 1968. Nothing happened when India blocked the CTBT in 1996. Even after India's nuclear tests in 1998, bilateral relations were back on the upswing by 2000, when President Clinton visited in March that year.
So there is no need to get pessimistic as some people are being. They are putting it out that if the deal falls through, relations will suffer grevous harm. Not a bit of it. India and America are two mature democracies, with long-standing traditions of diplomacy. both recognise that there will be breakthroughs and there will be setbacks. But in historical perspective, these are small blips. Long-term national interest is vastly more important.
It is clear also that there is no consensus on the two sides in favour of the deal. As it stands, the Indian side is dissatisfied. The left and the right are opposed, unusual though it is for both to agree on anything. If the offending conditions are removed from the Bill, the consensus will disintegrate on the American side. That doesn't sound like a good long-term bet.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is facing a serious choice. I am convinced he will be doing India a service by making the right choice, which is to go with the logic of his earlier public postures and say that the Bill departs from the commitments in the July 2005 Statement, and does not provide the basis for further talks. That is not just the right thing to do, it is also wise politically. The people of India respect leaders who stand up for the country. Indira Gandhi is the most respected Indian leader for just this quality. Deve Gowda did not suffer for blocking CTBT. AB Vajpayee positively benefited from conducting the nuclear tests. Manmohan Singh will gain in stature if he calls a halt to this deal.
The 500-odd members of the US Congress want India never to test again, regardless of circumstances. They want India not to enrich uranium. They want no reprocessing. They want no heavy water technology for India. They want India to adhere unilaterally to NSG and MTCR, as well as to PSI. This means India must accept all the responsibilities that go with membership of these bodies, but enjoy none of the benefits.
They are asking for intrusive controls, and oversight, on India's fissile material production.
The ultimate goal of the US Congress is to eliminate India's nuclear weapons. And they are proclaiming this in the Bill.
The Bill also wants to make India's foreign policy congruent to America's own, specially on Iran. This is truly breath-taking. You would expect that a country that is facing defeat in Iraq and Afghanistan, and is pretty much snookered in North Korea and Iran, is heading for confrontation with Russia and China, has alienated significant elements in Europe, would tell its friends - don't be like us! But, no, hubris reigns, and the US Congress demands that India make the same mistakes that America has made.
The explanatory notes attached to the Bill are equally revealing. To my reading, the most important is that they all but openly contradict Prime Minister Singh. This is the part where they address the statement to the Indian Parliament by the Prime Minister that in case of disruption of supplies, America and like-minded countries will get together to overcome the problem. The position in the Bill is that this can only be in the event of a market-related disruption. If, however, the disruption is caused by any "violation" by India of the unilateral conditions, America will actually ensure that no other country can step in and help out.
All of this is only for a one-time exception for India, for what happened before July 2005, the date of the Indo-US Joint Statement. For the future, India remains bound by the rules applicable to non-NWS under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Indeed, the demands and the supervision are even greater. What is more, the US President must offer annual assessments on India's "compliance" with the demands, as well as on India's overall nuclear posture - how much uranium was mined, how much used for weapons, how many weapons manufactured, and so on.
It is clear that America has shifted the goal posts. In fact, it has changed the nature of the agreement completely. What started out as an agreement on civil nuclear cooperation, has ended up as the offer of an agreement to shackle India to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In this form it is unacceptable. and, specially under a Democrat-controlled Congress, it is the only form we shall have on offer from the US.
It is also clear, from reading the text closely, that the Americans are leaving the door open for Pakistan to be allowed the same - or similar - terms. The chances are that America will not, itself, supply nuclear-related material to Pakistan, but this does open the door for China to do so. An agreement among NSG members to allow an exemption for India will probably only be passed if the NSG meets China's probable demand that the same be allowed for Pakistan.
It is also clear that America has lately - since the mid-1990's - been taking an attitude towards India that it would towards a client or dependent state. They ensured that India had no choice but to veto the CTBT by entering a provision that required an unwilling India (among other- willing - countries) to sign and ratify the Treaty for it to enter into force. This was unprecedented in the history of diplomacy and treaty-writing. All of this started a sequence of events that led to the eventual decision by India to test nuclear weapons in 1998. We are seeing the same kind of unilateral approach in this Bill.
It is likely that successive Indian Governments have given the Americans the sense that this kind of approach will yield results. But this is contradicted by the facts on the ground, and the history of later developments, which demonstrated that the pressure had backfired. You would expect America to have the good sense and intelligence to realise this. You would be wrong, it seems.
It is also instructive to read the writings of the supporters of the current Bill in India. Of those that I have read, none is offering a justification of the Bill that has emerged from the US Congress. Their basic position is that this is the best you can expect from the US. They also implicitly accept that the Bill does indeed depart substantively from the 18 July 2005 Statement. But, they say, look at the bigger picture, move beyond the minutiae and stop auditing the pluses and minuses. In my experience, when someone asks that we see the bigger picture, there is a defect in the smaller picture.
Also, the standard counsel of fear: if India will not accept this, it will damage ties with America.
For the rest and the bulk, a lot of abuse aimed at the opponents of the Bill. That is not good enough a defence of the Bill.
Friendship between India and America is important for India. No one in their right mind has any doubts about this. Fortunately, this is also what is happening. Economic relations are growing at an unprecedented rate. Business-to-business ties are on the up. Military contacts are increasing. Science and technology is another area where the two countries are moving forward.
In fact, in the high-level focus on the nuclear deal, many have lost sight of the equally important defence agreement that was signed in June 2005, just a few weeks before the nuclear deal. This has the potential to set a new level of defence cooperation between India and the US.
So let us leave this infructuous effort aside - a false start. This happens in human affairs, and there is nothing to be ashamed of in having tried and failed. No great harm will follow. It didn't when India refused to sign the NPT back in 1968. Nothing happened when India blocked the CTBT in 1996. Even after India's nuclear tests in 1998, bilateral relations were back on the upswing by 2000, when President Clinton visited in March that year.
So there is no need to get pessimistic as some people are being. They are putting it out that if the deal falls through, relations will suffer grevous harm. Not a bit of it. India and America are two mature democracies, with long-standing traditions of diplomacy. both recognise that there will be breakthroughs and there will be setbacks. But in historical perspective, these are small blips. Long-term national interest is vastly more important.
It is clear also that there is no consensus on the two sides in favour of the deal. As it stands, the Indian side is dissatisfied. The left and the right are opposed, unusual though it is for both to agree on anything. If the offending conditions are removed from the Bill, the consensus will disintegrate on the American side. That doesn't sound like a good long-term bet.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is facing a serious choice. I am convinced he will be doing India a service by making the right choice, which is to go with the logic of his earlier public postures and say that the Bill departs from the commitments in the July 2005 Statement, and does not provide the basis for further talks. That is not just the right thing to do, it is also wise politically. The people of India respect leaders who stand up for the country. Indira Gandhi is the most respected Indian leader for just this quality. Deve Gowda did not suffer for blocking CTBT. AB Vajpayee positively benefited from conducting the nuclear tests. Manmohan Singh will gain in stature if he calls a halt to this deal.
posted by psv brahmanand | 8:51 PM
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